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ABE FORTAS: A BIOGRAPHY. By Laura Kalman. New Haven: Yale 
University Press. 1990. Pp. xii, 499. $29.95. 
Laura Kalman's1 first book, Legal Realism at Yale, 2 attracted a 
great deal of attention from proponents of the Critical Legal Studies 
(CLS) movement.3 To the extent that legal realism and CLS grow 
from similar intellectual roots, commentators have linked the history 
of realism to the future of CLS.4 If this linking provides any insights 
into either the contemporary debate raging over the proper place for 
CLS in the legal academy or the likely impact the CLS movement will 
have on legal thinking, 5 it should come as no surprise that Legal Real-
ism at Yale has become required reading for jurisprudential scholars. 
In Kalman's new book, Abe Fortas: A Biography, she offers new in-
sights about the connections between the two movements, and implic-
itly suggests that the CLS movement has more to learn from legal 
realism. 
At first blush, the Fortas biography seems to grapple with different 
material than Kalman's account of legal realism at Yale. Although 
the biography shares the same painstaking research, attention to de-
tail, and concern with contextualization6 as the earlier work, it does 
not aspire to a topic as expansive as the "study of the interrelationship 
between intellectual theory and institutional factors within the specific 
context of legal education. "7 Instead, it draws on previously unavaila-
ble sources8 to tell the story of an important and somewhat enigmatic 
figure. And certainly it lives up to its billing as "[t]he best work on 
1. Laura Kalman, an associate professor of history at the University of California at Santa 
Barbara, is a member of the California bar. 
2. L. KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE: 1927-1960 (1986). 
3. See, e.g., Schlegel, Book Review, 41 STAN. L. REV. 435 (1989); Singer, Book Review, 76 
CALIF. L. REV. 465 (1988). 
4. Metaxas, Is the History of "Legal Realism" a Precedent fer the CLS debate?, Natl. L.J., 
Nov. 3, 1986, at 4, col. 2; cf. Book Notice, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1105, 1109 (1987) (predicting that 
the contribution of Legal Realism at Yale to legal academia would tum on similarities between 
realism and CLS). 
5. See L. KALMAN, supra note 2, at 229-31 (concluding that legal realism failed to achieve 
the transformation of legal thinking to which it aspired). 
6. See Schlegel, supra note 3, at 436 (calling Legal Realism at Yale "a carefully contextual-
ized intellectual history of realism"). 
7. L. KALMAN, supra note 2, at xi. 
8. Carol Agger, Abe Fortas' widow, denied other biographers access to Fortas' papers, ad-
ding to the anticipation surrounding the release ofKalman's book. See Hamilton, Book Review, 
68 TEX. L. REV. 673, 678 n.33, 686-87 (1990) (pointing to limitations in B. MURPHY, FORTAS: 
THE RISE AND RUIN OF A SUPREME CoURT JurncE (1988) and looking forward to Kalman's 
then-pending publication); cf. White, Recapturing New Deal Lawyers (Book Review), 102 HARV. 
L. REv. 489, 498-509 (1988) (criticizing Murphy's failure to delve into Fortas' personal life 
though recognizing the primary sources as "nearly inaccessible documents"). 
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Fortas to date."9 
Yet, in many respects the biography offers much more: by docu-
menting the rise and fall of one of the realist movement's best stu-
dents, it acts as a sort of sequel to Kalman's earlier book. If Legal 
Realism at l:'ale is the contextualization of a school of thought, Abe 
Fortas: A Biography is the personal history of the pupil's coming of 
age. To that extent, the new book also has important things to say to 
the contemporary legal community. 
The first three chapters of Kalman's biography trace Fortas' edu-
cation and early career, making clear that it would be difficult to find a 
better student of realism than Abe Fortas. Not only was he educated 
at Yale during the heyday of the realists, but Professors Jerome Frank, 
William 0. Douglas, and Thurmond Arnold became his mentors. Re-
alism had a profound impact on Fortas during his legal education (pp. 
14-26) and Fortas clearly aligned himself with the realist faculty when 
he taught at Yale from 1935 to 1938 (pp. 49-61). Kalman claims per-
suasively that the "New Deal liberalism" that attracted Fortas after 
graduation was for him "the political analogue of legal realism" (p. 
29). 
Fortas went on to have one of the greatest careers of any of the 
students trained by the realists. Editor-in-chief of the Yale Law Jour-
nal (p. 15), professor at Yale (p. 49), holder of a series of government 
jobs during the New Deal, including the post of Under-Secretary of 
the Department of the Interior at the age of thirty-two (pp. 77-101), 
co-founder and name partner of a successful Washington law firm (pp. 
125-96), close advisor to a U.S. president (pp. 199-227, 293-318), and 
Supreme Court justice (pp. 249-92) - Fortas' career reached the acme 
of practically every area of the profession. No student educated dur-
ing the heyday of realism accomplished more. 
Supporters of realism might cringe at this claim because they know 
the rest of the Fortas story. He allowed his most important clients to 
become close friends in a manner which clouded his judgment. Io Be-
cause his willingness to advise President Johnson from his seat on the 
Supreme Court compromised his judicial integrity, Fortas was pressed 
to resign from the Court (pp. 370-76). Ultimately his resignation 
helped to undercut the liberal social reforms he spent his career sup-
porting. I I Though he was a man with great strengths, he also had 
9. This quotation by Professor G. Edward White of the School of Law at the University of 
Virginia appears on the book's dustjacket. Kalman's biography is only the second full-length 
treatment of Fortas' life. Professor Murphy's book was the first. B. MURPHY, supra note 8. 
10. In addition, the biography suggests that Fortas used his connections with government 
officials, even with adjudicators, to further clients' causes. Pp. 158-66. "However strenuoiisly he 
denied it, [political] influence did figure in Fortas' practice, though there was no evidence he used 
it in an unethical way. And when convinced his cause was in the public interest, he exerted 
influence more vigorously still." P. 166. 
11. One compelling feature of Fortas' life - and thus Kalman's biography - is its progres-
sion from legal realism to the New Deal to the Great Society. As an insider to each of these 
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great weaknesses. 
Kahnan's biography does an excellent job of painting a portrait of 
Fortas that makes his downfall believable. But the book stops just 
short of making normative claims about the relation between Fortas' 
legal philosophy and his personal judgment. Kahnan begins Chapter 
Twelve with a dilemma: how would Fortas, once a participant "in a 
revolution questioning the existence of principled [judicial] decision 
making," (p. 249) reconcile his beliefs with his role as justice? Not 
insignificantly, the chapter ends with the statement that "[d]espite his 
attempt to present himself as 'a man of law,' Fortas rarely believed 
that law commanded him to act against his own wishes" (p. 276). 
Kahnan does not suggest that others would necessarily resolve this 
dilemma similarly, and she certainly does not claim that every realist 
student who might have served in the judiciary would meet Fortas' 
fate. She does assert, however, that realism's influence on Fortas 
colored his judicial thinking.12 
Of course, many realists would disagree with Fortas' belief that 
law rarely constrains judicial actors. In fact, there is little reason to 
believe that more than a minority of the scholars claiming to be real-
ists would stand by this proposition. Yet the skeptical strand of real-
ism - perhaps best embodied by Jerome Frank's comment about 
judges' digestion13 - figured centrally in Fortas' legal philosophy.14 
To the extent that the proponents of CLS have pushed claims of radi-
cal indeterminacy to even greater extremes than Frank and other 
skeptical realists did, 15 CLS students are more likely than realist stu-
dents to face tensions between legal philosophy and professional judg-
ment as they progress through their careers. If contemporary thinkers 
want to direct CLS students away from Fortas' mistakes, they could 
benefit from reading Kahnan's book. 
This is not to suggest that current students of CLS are likely to 
follow Fortas down a path to "corruption."16 Even if Fortas did give 
movements, Fortas had a close view of the central liberal agenda of the mid-twentieth century. 
Whatever his personal failings, Fortas' unquestioned competence, unswerving dedication, and 
hard work for this agenda will certainly make him an appealing character for a large percentage 
of the readers of this book. 
12. Kalman explicitly addresses the tensions between Fortas' judicial approach and his dedi-
cation to realism. Pp. 271-76. 
13. See J. FRANK, CoURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 161-62 
(1949) (discussing the value of "gastronomical jurisprudence"). 
14. In this context, it is worth noting that the skeptical Frank had a formative influence on 
Fortas. P. 31. 
15. See, e.g., Kelman, Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REV. 293 (1984); Kennedy, Form and Sub-
stance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1685 (1976); Unger, The Critical Legal 
Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REv. 563 (1983). 
16. In this regard, the following attack on CLS seems vastly overblown: 
What [the legal profession] cannot abide is the embrace of nihilism and its lesson that who 
decides is everything, and principle nothing but cosmetic .•.• The nihilist teacher threatens 
to rob his or her students of the courage to act on such professional judgment as they may 
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in to indiscretion, his failings resulted as much from hypocrisy as from 
any dedication to realism or liberalism. Kalman sums up Fortas' hy-
pocrisy in her prologue: "As a public servant and officer of the Court, 
[Fortas] prescribed rules for society. As a private individual, he bent 
them" (p. 2). He devoted his career to great liberal causes while con-
ducting his personal affairs, especially regarding women, in a less than 
progressive manner.17 He relied heavily on others as mentors, but he 
never acted as mentor to anyone himself; he tried to protect friends 
from intolerant superiors, but he behaved tyrannically toward his own 
staff members, from the time of his editorship of the Yale Law Journal 
straight through his law practice. 
Undoubtedly some of Fortas' professional limitations developed 
from personal character flaws. Still, judges, government officials, law-
yers, and other legal actors who believe that law does not constrain 
them may be prone to reject all checks on personal, and sometimes 
illegitimate, desires. Ultimately the readers of the Fortas biography 
are left with an uneasy lesson: recognition of rules' coercive effect on 
others, when combined with a radical disregard for rules in one's own 
life, can result in tremendous power but with monstrous effects. 
Nearly every contemporary scholar teaching, studying, or even think-
ing about legal skepticism could benefit from a hard look at Fortas' 
life. If Abe Fortas is indeed the progeny of legal realism at Yale, read-
ers of Kalman's earlier work cannot afford to ignore this new book. 
- Michael F. Colosi 
have acquired. Teaching cynicism may, and perhaps probably does, result in the learning of 
corruption: bribery and intimidation. In an honest effort to proclaim a need for revolution, 
nihilist teachers are more likely to train crooks than radicals. If this risk is correctly ap-
praised, the nihilist who must profess that legal principle does not matter has an ethical duty 
to depart the law school, perhaps to seek a place elsewhere in the academy. 
Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL. EDUC. 222, 227 (1984). 
Though Fortas' professional ethical trangressions give observers some pause, Kalman's biog-
raphy indicates Fortas' indiscretion stemmed as much from personality as training. The book 
also documents, in some detail, Fortas' ability as a lawyer. Furthermore, there is no reason to 
suspect that a lawyer trained by a nihilist is any more likely to become a "crook" - whatever 
Dean Carrington meant by the term - than a more traditionally educated lawyer is, even if the 
transition from radical politics to mainstream institutions poses philosophical challenges. 
17. Kalman notes that Fortas prided himself on his extramarital affairs and his prowess with 
women. Pp. 194-95. But rather than criticizing this conduct, Kalman explains it away, saying 
"[i]t was an era in which Washington valued conquest more than chastity .... Further, Fortas 
genuinely liked women ...• [B]ut a relationship with one did not preclude others." P. 196. 
